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ABSTRACT 
Despite the economic importance of the banking industry and having a high market 
capitalization of 3.934 trillion in 2009, modicum research have focused on the 
relationship between Nigerian banks and their auditors. This models audit fees in 
relation to other variables like CEO duality, audit firm, firm age, firm location, firm 
risk, firm profitability, firm size, and the board composition. We achieve this objective 
by employing data from 17 banks listed on the Nigerian stock exchange, for the period 
of 2004-2009. The generalized least square regression technique was applied. We 
found, among others, that audit fees is an increasing function of  firm age, firm location, 
firm risk, firm size, proportion of non executive directors to total directors and a 
decreasing function of firm profitability and  proportion of executive directors to total 
directors.  
 
KEYWORDS: Audit fees, Nigerian banks and audit effort 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Nigerian financial system has experienced several reformations, which varies from 
the establishment of the Nigerian Stock Exchange in 1960 to the recapitalization 
process of 2005. The recapitalization process has compelled banks to meet the 
minimum capital base of N25billion capital base from N2billion. After this process, the 
number of banks was reduced to 21 banks out of the 299 companies listed on the 
Nigerian stock exchange in 2009, with a market capitalization of N3.934 trillion. 
Amidst this reformation, the Nigerian financial system is characterized by several issues 
such as poor corporate governance, bad stewardship disposition by corporate heads, 
poor financial reporting and noncompliance with statutory requirements in financial 
reporting.  
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In modeling audit fees, evidence has shown that attention has been paid to two broad 
group of data sets- macro-economic and data from financial and nonfinancial 
companies. From a macro-economic view, Taylor and Simon (1999) states that an 
increased litigation pressures, institutional traditions of increased disclosure, and 
increased regulation can put upward pressures on audit fees. From the other stance, 
Karim and Moizer (2002) studied both the financial and non financial companies in 
Bangladesh, the peculiarity of the Bangladeshi audit service being the non direct 
involvement of international audit firms. Their study revealed that the size of the auditor 
has the greatest influence on audit fees. Furthermore financial services companies were 
found to have higher audit fees relative to non-financial companies. The surprising 
result was that auditors which employed at least one qualified accountant had higher 
audit fees. 
Evidence from developing countries as studied by Shammari et al (2008) shows that 
there were similarities in determining factors as other countries previously studied, the 
differences being no fee premium in Kuwait for the Big four auditing firms as audit fees 
is positively associated with client’s size and clients operation complexities. Field et al 
(2004) asserts that audit fees are higher for banks due to the fact that they have more 
transaction accounts, high degrees of credit risk, regulatory risk and they are more 
involved in mergers and acquisition. 
Alongside this, other studies have examined some determinants of audit fees: firm’s risk 
(Choi et al 2007, Joshi and Al-bastaki 2000),  Auditor’s size (Chan et al 2006, Choi et 
al 2007), firm’s corporate governance (Chan et al 2006 and Yatim et al 2006), firm’s 
size (Cantoni et al n,d, Chan et al 2006, Field et al 2004 and Joshi and Al-bastaki 
2000), Firm’s profitability (Chan et al 2006; Joshi and Al-bastaki 2000 and Willenkens 
2009), Firm’s industry leadership (Chan et al 2006, Ferguson et al 2003 and Francis et 
al 2004) and Firm’s age (Zulkarnain and Shamsher 2008). 
To this end, the study of audit fees in the Nigerian banks is of utmost importance as 
little or no evidence exist for Nigeria. The objectives of this study, therefore,  is to 
examine the determinants of audit fees in the Nigerian banking sector. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section two deals with the 
literature review; section three explores the research method employed by the study; 
section four discusses the empirical results 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Banks form the chief cornerstone of any financial system, and indeed of the economy of 
a nation. However in the face of errors and intent to defraud, the audit function lies at 
the heart of banks. The experience of failed banks in Nigeria has called for 
reinforcement of audit in other to restore stakeholder’s confidence back to the system. 
In today’s volatile business environment, the Nigerian banking system is faced with 
wide array of complex business challenges which include challenges in form of 
regulatory compliance, litigation, competitive market, pressure, changing technology, 
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investors demand, corporate governance, business ethics and accountability. (Okafor 
and Ibadin, 2009) 
In Nigeria the rave of corporate failures witnessed in the financial sector in the early 
1990s brought auditors into sharp focus and caused the Nigerian public to question the 
role of accountants and auditors (Okike, 2004; Bakre, 2007; Ajibolade 2008). 
Furthermore, the investigations launched by the regulators and other stakeholders into 
the cases of distress and disclosure revealed that accountants and auditors were 
implicated (NDIC, 1995). 
The recent banking crisis in Nigeria members of the auditing profession in Nigeria are 
once again in the limelight, as the banking crisis and the revelation of unethical 
practices by bank executives and board members has raised many questions about the 
ethical standards of the accounting profession and about the integrity of financial 
reports issued by professional accountants. In 2009 the Central Bank of Nigeria 
conducted an audit into the activities of the 24 registered banks. Their investigation 
revealed that Afribank, Finbank, Intercontinental bank, Oceanic bank and Union bank 
were experiencing huge financial difficulties in their operations, as such N420 billion 
was injected into them as they had failed the CBN audit. Two months later, an 
additional N200 billion was injected to stimulate the liquidity of four other banks (Bank 
PHB, Equitorial Trust Bank, Spring Bank and Wema Bank). This injection of money 
was done in order to stabilize the banks and to ensure that they remained going concerns 
after their former managers had been sacked for reckless lending and for lax corporate 
governance which had rendered the institutions undercapitalized. 
The nature of the recent banking crisis in Nigeria, which has resulted in concerns being 
voiced about the apparent lack of independence or technical incompetence of the 
auditors involved, has cast doubt on the functional capacity of audit technologies. The 
table below shows the bank that failed the Central Bank of Nigeria audit in 2009, even 
though they had all received unqualified audit reports in the preceding accounting year. 
Figure 2.1               Banks that failed the central bank report in 2009 
Bank                     Auditor               Date of Audit report     Audit Opinion       Auditor 
fees (N’m) 
Afribank               AWD                           Mar 2008  Unqualified            38 
Finbank                AWD & AI                  Dec 2008              Unqualified                  67 
Union Bank          AWD & BTN              Oct. 2009             Unqualified                 118 
Intercontinental    PwC                             May 2008             Unqualified                 150 
Oceanic Bank       PwC                             May 2009             Unqualified                 115 
Note: AWD- Akintola Williams Delloite, AI- Aminu Ibrahim & Co, BTN- Baker Tilly Nigeria, PwC- 
Price water house Coopers 
Source: Compiled from companies Annual reports and Accounts 
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From the table above it is glaring that auditors receive a considerable income from their 
audit clients. In 2009 Price Water House (PwC) had global gross revenue of $26.2 
billion, the Middle East and Africa (Nigeria inclusive) contributing $704 million. 
Akintola Williams Deloitte (AWD) another giant accounting firm, with global revenue 
of nearly $26.1 billion in 2009 with Middle East and Africa (Nigeria inclusive) 
contributing $10.2 billion. (Otusanya and Lauwo 2010) 
The contending proposition that auditees might be willing to pay more to competent, 
independent auditors and might not be willing to pay as much as for the services of an 
auditor whose competence or independence is perceived to be compromised still remain 
a puzzle as the Big four auditors in Nigeria are reputed to be more competent and render 
better audit services. 
Several studies had delved on the determinants of audit fees around the world, much of 
this works focused on developed countries. These studies include Jubb et al, (1996), 
Houghton and Jubb, (1999) in Australia, Anderson and Zeghal (1994) in Canada, 
Taylor (1997), in Japan, Palmrose (1996) and Gist (1992) in United States of American 
while Che Ahmad and Houghton (1996) in United kingdom. Nevertheless limited 
studies have undertaken emerging economies especially Nigeria. 
Modeling audit fees has been observed in several dimensions. Hope and Langli (2009) 
used audit fees as a measure for potential auditor independence, impairment and test 
whether auditors that receive high unexpected fees are less likely to issue a going 
concern opinion, arguing that a private company setting provides a unique context to 
give independence impairment test due to both lower auditor reputation and litigation 
risk compared to a public company setting. Willekens (2009) investigated the effect of 
unexpected audit fees on financial reporting quality in private companies stating that 
unexpected fees are not an appropriate measure to test treat of auditor independence in 
private company setting, arguing that the private client segment of the audit market is 
subject to fierce price competition due to lower supplier concentration and larger 
number of potential suppliers, hence auditors should not be able to charge rents to their 
private clients and therefore unexpected audit fees can only reflect a client’s willingness 
to pay for extra auditor effort or quality also unexpected audit fees enhance financial 
reporting quality in a private firm setting therefore not an appropriate proxy for testing 
auditor independence impairment. 
Srinidhi and Gul (2009) observed that the positive relationship between audit fees and 
audit effort can be explained by the high level of competition in the audit services 
market, which reduces the possibility to earn rents in audit fees. Teo and Keith (2000) 
argues that audit quality is related positively to audit fees as the reputation of an audit 
firm is correlated to the perceived audit quality emphatically noting that audit litigation 
impacts on reputation negatively because it may be seen as an indicator of a lack of 
audit quality. 
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The complexities encountered in auditing client’s company are determinant of audit 
fees. Hogan and Wilkins (2008) assert that audit firms seem to increase their fees when 
internal control deficiencies exist, particularly in cases where the problems are the most 
severe. Their work has been found to be the case in Bell et al (2001) and Johnstone 
(2006) studies suggesting that auditors increase their effort in the presence of increased 
control risk, highlighting that audit fees are significantly higher for internal control 
deficient client firms whether or not they hire a Big 4 auditor or not though the 
incremental fee for clients of Big 4 auditors is significantly higher than the incremental 
fee for clients of non Big 4 auditors. 
The Cadbury committee report (1992) prescribed that CEO duality should be 
discouraged. It is perceived that the conflict of interests of an individual occupying both 
positions might result in reduced corporate governance. Shareholders protect 
themselves from the expropriation of the insiders via sound corporate governance. 
However the role of the auditor is to increase trust on the accounts audited by him 
stating his undiluted opinion on the truth and fairness of the accounts. Simunic (1980) 
explains that the amount of audit fees is a function of the auditor’s effort during 
engagement and the risk incurred by the auditors after the disclosure of his/her audit 
report, CEO duality can increase the risk incurred by auditors during the audit process. 
Consequently agency conflicts influences the audit pricing (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 
2008).  
An audit firm size is being associated with audit quality as larger firms have more to 
lose from a lack of independence perceived than smaller firms due to their more 
substantial client base, giving them the incentive to be relatively more independent. 
Evidence on the relationship between the status of audit firm and audit fee charge had 
been divergent. Simunic (1980) and Firth (1985) found no difference between fees 
charged by big and small audit firms. On the contrary recent researches (Liu 2007, Teo 
and Keith 2000) observed that larger firms in fact do charge higher audit fees than 
smaller firms establishing that Big four auditors have better resources, reputation 
capable of providing better audit service, have higher litigation risk and may receive 
more severe punishment than non Big four auditors. In this study audit firms were 
classified as Big four or non Big four. 
Zulkarnain and Shamsher (2008), Hope and Langli (2008) Argued that younger firms 
are more vulnerable to higher risk of failure or incur losses in their early years of 
operations compared to older firms as such they are subjected to more audit work and as 
such auditors would charge more fees to young companies. 
Firms’ location has a significant impact on their performance. For example, firms’ with 
head offices in Lagos have a high chance of performing better than others with head 
office in other states of the nation. This is argued because of the commercial intensity in 
this area compared to other locations and the likelihood of having higher access to 
capital, which invariably may not have been accessible if located in other states. It is 
worthy of note that 99% of the head offices of financial institutions are located in the 
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Lagos and having head offices in this location will somewhat enhance easy social 
connection, which can translate into easy access of capital when needed (Akinlesi and 
Efobi 2010).  
Banks are exposed to higher risk due to transaction accounts, high degrees of credit risk, 
regulatory risk and their more involvement in mergers and acquisition. Fields, Frasers 
and Wilkins (2004) sees bank risks in the following dimensions; liquidity risk, 
operating risk, credit risk, capital or solvency risk, and market risk. Liquidity risk relates 
to the possibility that the bank cannot meet its obligations for cash through the clearing 
system or from its depositors. Operating risk refers to the possibility of high operating 
costs depleting the capital account of the bank. Banks with high operating risk will find 
it difficult or impossible to earn acceptable profit without taking unacceptable risk. 
Credit risk primarily involves the quality of the banks assets and the probabilities of 
default in its loan portfolio, though credit risk may also exist in the securities portfolio. 
Capital risk refers to the potential that shrinkage in the value of assets will deplete the 
banks equity account. Finally, market risk involves the potential for negative impact on 
the banks financial viability from adverse movements in interest rates.   
The Nigerian bank is highly leverage debt contributing more that 90% of total assets. 
Liu (2007) opines that auditors seeks to charge higher fees for firms undertaking more 
financial risks in other to shield against liability for losses attributable to 
misrepresentations in the audited financial statements. 
Profitability entails efficient use of resources usually results in a high return on assets. 
Highly profitable firms usually pay more fees in view of the fact that higher profits may 
require rigorous auditing testing of the validity of the recognition of revenue and 
expenses which requires more audit time. Nevertheless evidence is inconclusive in this 
regard as studies by Francis and Simon (1987) and Chan (1993) did not find it 
significant, subsequent studies of Joshi and Al-Bastaki (2000) found it significant.   
In ascertaining the determinant of audit fees Chan et al (2006) sees Client’s firm size as 
an influential factor. Karim and Moizer (2002) asserted that client’s firm size has the 
greatest influence on audit fees. Prior researches (Liu 2007; Joshi and Al-bastaki 2000), 
measured client’s firm size as total assets, this has however been found to be a 
significant explanatory variable in determine audit fees. The larger the client’s firm size 
the more effort auditor has to put in audit process thus the higher the audit fees.  
The two main functions of the Board of Directors are to monitor and provide resources 
to the company as postulated by Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003). Non executive directors will be more concern about their personal exposure and 
legal liability if mangers misbehave; therefore they are more interested in an extensive 
audit testing in order to minimize the risk of managerial misbehavior that could affect 
their personal liability. While executive directors representing large shareholders are 
typically better informed, having capital invested in the company as such seeks to 
promote shareholders interest and ability to influence management directing. Studies 
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from O’Sullivan (2000) and Salleh, et al (2006) found that the proportion of non 
executive directors encourage more intensive audits as a complement to their own 
monitoring role. 
2.3 Theoretical framework 
The basic theory underpinning this study is the Simunic (1980) audit fees model. The 
theory iterates that audit fees are equal to audit costs at a competitive equilibrium and a 
function of auditors characteristics such as audit firm size and industry expertise at the 
national level 
 
The mathematical expression to Simunic model is: 
E(C) = cq + E(d)E(θ), 
Where E(C) is the expected total costs to the auditor or the audit fees; c the per unit 
factor cost of external audit resources to the auditor, including all opportunity costs and 
thus including a markup for a normal profit; q the quantity of resources that the auditor 
utilizes in performing the audit; E(d) the expected present value of possible future losses 
that may arise from this period’s audited financial statements; and E(θ) the likelihood 
that the auditor will have to pay for the losses from this period’s audited financial 
statements. 
According to Simunic model, the expected total costs to the auditor varies in 
relationship with the level of audit effort [cq] and the expected liability loss component 
[E(d)E(θ)]. In an increasing audit effort it is envisaged that the expected liability loss 
component to decrease. This implies that the quality and efficiency of the audit work 
determines the liability losses that are typically manifested in the form of litigation, 
either actual or threatened against the audit firm. If this is true then E(d) = f(cq). 
Simunic (1980) posits that the auditor’s assessment of the loss function should be 
influenced by the general legal environment as well as internal firm’s specific factors. 
The size of the auditee, complexity of the auditee’s operations, asset structure and 
whether the auditee is a publicly held company are all firm’s specific characteristics that 
might influence the assessment of the loss function.  
Drawing from the model, the focus of this study is to observe the factors that influence 
the audit fees. These factors include the firm’s corporate governance, firm’s size, firm’s 
age, firm’s profitability, firms’ risk, audit firm, firm location 
3.0 RESEARCH METHOD 
The data used for this study was gotten both from content analysis and computation of 
adequate ratios from the financial statement of the sampled firms. The period 2004-
2009 was studied. The financial statement of the firms is reliable since it contains 
detailed information about the firm. The items of interest from the financial statement 
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include; balance sheets and the profit and loss account. The data set is a panel data, 
consisting of 17 out of 21 banks listed on the Nigerian stock exchange (NSE)  
The empirical model of this study is developed to capture the determinant of audit fees 
in the Nigerian banks is represented by this functional relationship; 
Audfee = f (CEOdualit, Audfirmit, Firmageit, Firmlocit, Firmrikit, Firmproit, Firmsizit, 
Pxdirit Pnxdirit Uit ) ----------------------------------------------------------
--------------- (1)
 
Equation (1) is stated in an explicit form as thus: 
Audfee = f (β0 CEOdualit + β1 Audfirmit,+ β2 Firmageit,+ β3 Firmlocit,+ β4 Firmrikit,+ 
β5 Firmproit,+ β6 Firmsizit,+ β7 Pxdirit + β8 Pnxdirit + Uit) -----------------------------------
-----------(2) 
Where: 
Audfee:     To be represented by log of audit fees  
CEOdual: This means that the chief executive officer is the same as the chairman. CEO 
Duality is measured as a categorical variable with 1, when the CEO holds 
the same position as the chairman and 0 if otherwise  
Audfirm:   Audit firm, 1 denoted Big four and 0 denoted Non Big four 
Firmage:  Firm age was represented by age of incorporation 
Firmloc:   Firm location, 1 represented firm’s headquarters in Lagos and 0 for otherwise  
Firmrik:  Firm risk was captured by leverage which is proxied by total debt divided by 
total assets 
Firmpro:  Firm profitability was represented by Profit after tax 
Firmsiz:    Firm size was represented by log of total assets 
Pxdir:       Proportion of executive directors to total directors on board 
Pnxdir:     Proportion of non-executive directors to total directors on board 
U:           Error term that captures other factors influencing the dependent variables that 
are not included in the model. They are assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed. 
it:             The companies and the time dimensions 
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βi (i =0 - 6): Parameters to be estimated, which show the constant and the rate of 
change in the dependent variable induced by the respective chosen 
explanatory variables.  
4.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Our study utilized Generalised least square regression model in Gretl to analyze our 
data. The model formulated was based on panel data econometric technique. Panel data 
has several advantages which include that it helps to obtain efficient estimates by 
possibly controlling for unobserved fixed effects and also providing sufficient degree of 
freedom (Osabuohien and Efobi, 2010). The Generalised Least Squares (GLS) 
estimation was first examined, but due to the problem of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation popularly encountered when using the (GLS) in estimation of panel data 
series, Hausman test was used to select the most suitable between the Fixed Effects (FE) 
and Random Effects (RE) and the fixed effect was found more suitable  
This section discusses the descriptive as well as the empirical result, which further will 
aid the testing of the hypothesis.  
4.1 Summary of descriptive Statistics 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Audit fee 52628 40000 37308 5175 180000 
CEO duality 0 0 0 0 0 
Firm age 23.71 19 12.38 5 50 
Firm location 0.9411 1 0.24956 0 1 
Audit firm 1 1 0 1 1 
Firm profit 7980100 5851500 11932000 -57739000 46525000 
Firm size 401450000 255870000 392450000 331800 1680300000 
Firm risk 26.434 0.85811 140.28 0.000775 796.47 
Percentage of director 0.3492 0.36364 0.10149 0.066667 0.6 
Percentage of non-executive director 0.64323 0.63636 0.11531 0.4 1 
From the table above Audfee, Firmpro and Firmsize are in (N, Million) 
Table 1 represents the descriptive statistics of the 17 observed banks listed on the 
Nigerian stock exchange. The average audit fee paid by a bank in Nigeria is N52, 
628,000 with some Banks paying a minimum of N5,175, 000 and others a maximum of 
N180,000,000. All the banks have their Chief executive Director different from their 
chairman in all cases this corroborates that the banking sector embraces good corporate 
governance. None of the banks is less than 5 years old from year of incorporation this is 
however a standard measure of more audit engagement. 93.4% of the banks have their 
headquarters in Lagos. The Big four audit firms in Nigeria are characterized with 
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having more and better resources, thereby capable of providing better audit service than 
the non big 4 audit firms. All the banks are being audited by big four audit firms 
(KPMG; Ernst and Young; Akintola Williams Delloitte; PWC) in Nigeria.  
Averagely the profit after tax of the banks is almost N80, 000,000,000. On the average 
the Total assets of the banks is N401, 450,000,000. We can infer that the larger the size 
of an auditee the more the effort of the auditor in the audit process, the higher the audit 
fees. The risk of the bank is proxied by leverage calculated as total debt over total assets 
from the table (264%) is quite high, meaning the banking sector is highly leveraged. 
This means that on the average the debt of the firm is twice plus more than the total 
asset employed  by the firm, this surrogates that the more the firm financial risks, the 
higher the auditor liability for misrepresentations in the audited financial statements 
thus the higher the expected audit fees. 
On the average the proportion of the executive director to the total director is 35% this 
implies that why the proportion of non executive director to the director is 65% this 
implies that the non executive directors are almost twice the number of executive 
directors  
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
The correlation matrix shows the expected relationship of all the independent variables 
with audit fee, it also shows the correlation amongst the independent variables which 
suggest the presence or absence of multicolinearity. We suspect any variable with 
coefficient in excess of 0.80 to exhibit multicollinearity as a result such variables will be 
dropped to avoid estimation that may result in spurious result. The test for 
multicollinearity was carried out using the correlation analysis, in order to investigate 
the existence of correlation between the independent variables. This is important 
because if such exist, it may adversely affect the result from the analysis, hence may 
lead to spurious regression result. 
Table 2                    Correlation Coefficient Matrix of all Variables 
 
Audfee Firmage Firmloc Firmpro Firmsiz Firmrik Pxdir Pnxdir 
Audfee 1 0.1038 -0.079 0.6632 0.3687 0.2698 0.2117 -0.1749 
Firmage 
 
1 0.1479 0.2613 0.1307 0.0449 0.291 -0.2333 
Firmloc 
  
1 -0.0895 -0.1025 0.044 0.0281 -0.0536 
Firmpro 
   
1 0.5107 0.179 0.3348 -0.2913 
Firmsiz 
    
1 -0.6611 0.1395 -0.1148 
Firmrik 
     
1 0.1146 -0.1227 
Pxdir 
      
1 -0.9173 
Pnxdir 
       
1 
From our result there is a weak positive correlation exits between audit fee (Audfee) Firm age 
(Firmage), Firm size (Firmsiz), firm risk (Firmrik) and Proportion of executive directors to total 
directors (Pxdir) at 10%, 37%, 27% and 21% respectively. A strong positive correlation exists 
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between Audit fee (Audfee) and Firm profitability (Firmpro) at 66% while a weak negative 
correlation was found between Audit fee (Audfee), firm location (Firmloc) and proportion of 
non executive directors to total directors (Pnxdir) at 8% and 17% respectively. 
From the table, there was no problem of multicollinearity amongst Audit fee (Audfee) Firm Age 
(Firmage), Firm Location (Firmloc), Firm profitability (Firmpro), Firm size (Firmsize), Firm 
risk (Firmrik). While the problem of multicollinearity exist only between Proportion of 
executive directors to total director (Pxdir) and Proportion of non executive directors (Pnxdir) 
as such the collinear variable will be dropped to avoid estimation that will result in spurious 
result, since all the variables are important in our model, a stepwise regression will be done for 
the estimation. This will aid in preventing the multicollinear variables from being estimated in 
the analysis 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
Table 3:                         Regression result for the estimated model 
 
 OLS 1 FE 1 RE 1 OLS 2 FE 2 RE 2 
constant -3.7088 -3.47 -3.82953 -3.4736 -3.6167 -4.1978 
(0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0000) (0.0051) (0.0028) (0.0000) 
Firmage -0.0038 0.0716 -0.0042 -0.0035 0.0763 -0.0046 
(0.4744) (0.3962) (0.5027) (0.4942) (0.3631) (0.4594) 
Firmloc -0.0293 0.0032 -0.0341 0.0111 
(0.7009) (0.9919) (0.6384) (0.9715) 
Firmrik 0.0076 0.00647 0.0078 0.0077 0.0063 0.0078 
(0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) 
Firmpro -0.1561 -0.0763 -0.1089 -0.1558 -0.7 -0.1052 
(0.0143) (0.2189) (0.0459) (0.0156) (0.2466) (0.0546) 
Firmsiz 0.8197 0.7031 0.842 0.8221 0.685 0.8339 
(0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) 
Pxdir 0.3317 -0.3916 -0.5469 
(0.5935) (0.3496) (0.1101) 
Pnxdir 0.8848 0.25 0.438 
(0.0018) (0.4842) (0.1713) 
R-squared 0.7613 0.9122 0.7608 0.9111 
Normality 1.288 1.956 2.76 0.658 2.467 2.682 
test 0.5251 0.3761 0.2515 0.7196 0.2912 0.2615 
Breusch & Pagan 28.5376 23.6432 
test 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman 6.9108 7.836 
test 0.2274 0.1655 
Observation 73 73 73 73 73 73 
Vision 2020: Sustainable Growth, Economic Development, and Global Competitiveness            753 
 
The empirical results from the estimation process are presented in table 3 above. The result from different estimation 
techniques (i.e. Ordinary OLS, FE, RE) are presented and discussed herein. From the correlation matrix the existence 
of the multicollinear variables at 80% were dealt with by excluding proportion of non executive director to total 
directors in first regression including proportion of executive director to total directors while in the second regression, 
proportion of executive directors to total directors was included while excluding the proportion of non executive 
directors to total directors. The hausman test for the first and second regression showed that the fixed effect was more 
efficient and appropriate than the random effect  
Most of the variables came out with expected signs; CEO duality and audit firm type 
was omitted in the regression result due to exact colinearity.  All the sample banks 
observed had the chairman different from the chief executive officer this indicates a 
good corporate governance practice. Dual CEO role creates a strong individual power 
base, which could impair board independence and the effectiveness of its governing 
function may thus be compromised.  
 
Within the five years of our observation the study revealed that all the banks were 
audited by at least one of the big four audit firm in Nigeria. A positive relationship exit 
between the age of the firm and audit fees, it implies that the older the firm gets the 
more the audit engagement as such more audit fee is required aside this we presume that 
older firm have more capacity to pay more for audit while younger firms do not have 
such capacity. 
The result under the fixed effect for firm location was omitted being that almost all the 
observed banks had their headquarters in Lagos; this supports the proposition that 99% 
of the financial institution firm is located in Lagos. This is argued because of the 
commercial intensity in this area compared to other locations. 
Firm risk is significantly related to bank audit fees. The risk of the firm proxy by firm 
leverage is positively related to the bank audit fees being as a result of the high leverage 
characterized by banks, thus the higher the bank risk the higher the auditor liability for 
misrepresentation in the audited financial statements the more the audit fees charged 
Firm profitability is negatively related to bank audit fees this implies that more profit 
the firm makes the lesser the audit fee, perhaps profitable firms’ cuts down excess audit. 
Firm size is positively related to bank audit fees. The significance of this indicates that 
larger firms will have larger balance sheets assets and liabilities thereby requiring more 
audit task as such attract more audit fees. 
The proportion of executive directors to total director is negatively related to bank audit 
fees, while that of non executive directors is positively related to bank audit fees. This 
speculates that the higher the porportion of executive director to total directors the lower 
the expected audit fees, This follows stakeholders expectation of the executive director 
who are insider of the company assumed to have a good corporate governance practice 
and the existence of an improved control mechanisms thus reducing the need for 
external auditing, leading to lower audit fees. While the higher the proportion of non 
executive director the higher the expected audit fees, this could be as a result of the 
board being dominated by outside, nonaffiliated directors, who however, are thought to 
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play more effective monitoring roles because of their fiduciary duty towards 
shareholders and their presume independence from management as such might not mind 
paying more for a better audit quality 
5.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The audit report reveals the auditor’s findings to users of financial report which plays a 
crucial role in warning them of the impending problems with the firm. Elucidating 
whether or not that audit fees does not compromise auditor objectivity; the objective of 
the study was to provide empirical evidence on the determinant of audit fees in Nigerian 
banks particularly from the demand side perspective. Using generalized least square 
regression model to analyse the significant relationship amongst our variables.  
The empirical evidence on this relationship provides a unique contribution to the dearth 
of literature on this field in Nigeria. A total of 17 banks out of the 21 listed banks were 
observed. Based on the present study we found that in Nigerian banks audit fees are 
significantly related to CEO duality, Audit Firm, Firm Age, Firm Location, Firm Risk, 
Firm Profitability, Firm Size, Proportion of executive and non executive directors to 
total directors but with a positive relationship with Firm Age, Firm Location, Firm Risk, 
Firm Size, Proportion of non executive directors to total directors, a negative 
relationship with Firm Profitability and Proportion of executive directors to total 
directors and exact collinearity with CEO duality and Audit firm. 
On the adequacy of a sound corporate governance climate in Nigeria, the study 
observed two indicators of corporate governance, the first being CEO duality and the 
second proportion of executive and non executive directors to total directors. 
Remarkably all the observed banks had the Chief Executive Director different from the 
chairman also the proportion of non executive directors to total directors surpasses the 
proportion of executive directors to total directors, surrogating that the management is 
not dominating the control of the companies. 
Another interesting findings was that all the firms observed were at least audited by one 
of the big four auditors in Nigeria. This can be seen in two lights. The first being that 
banks are characterized with large asset, high expected regulatory compliance, high 
litigation risk, changing technology, adherence to sound corporate governance, complex 
transaction accounts, high degrees of credit risk, regulatory risk and their more 
involvement in mergers and acquisition as such more rigorous audit were require since 
the big four auditors are known for their access to resources, reputation, capable of 
providing better audit service, having higher litigation risk and may receive more severe 
punishment than non Big four auditors. However in the Nigerian case we recommend 
that banks audit should be carried out by a big four auditor and a non big four auditor 
simultaneously for a better audit coverage. 
We identify the following limitations in this study. First, the sample only covers banks 
listed on the Nigerian stock exchange. It is therefore possible that the results may not be 
generalized to other listed companies in other sectors and Subsequent studies could 
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examine other sectors while making a sectorial comparison amongst them. Second, we 
majorly looked at the demand side perspective of the audit fee model; future research 
could carry out a simultaneous analysis of this model whilst looking at the determinant 
of audit fee from the supplier’s perspective (auditors). However this data might be 
sourced via a survey method of data collection in the audit firms, such information will 
provide increased confidence to our results.  
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